Darkkomet

Overview

DarkComet (frequently cataloged in security telemetry as DarkKomet or Backdoor.Win32.DarkKomet) is an iconic, feature-packed Remote Access Trojan (RAT) originally authored in 2008 by independent French developer Jean-Pierre Lesueur (known online as 'DarkCoderSC'). Developed in Delphi, the tool boasted an intuitive graphical management console, low system resource utilization, and deep surveillance capabilities—including real-time audio and webcam surveillance, full keystroke logging, remote desktop streaming, reverse proxying, and file manipulation. Although originally marketed as a dual-use remote administration utility, DarkComet was aggressively weaponized by cybercriminals, hacktivists, and advanced persistent threat groups globally. Most notably between 2011 and 2014 during the Syrian Civil War, Syrian state-aligned threat actors deployed weaponized DarkComet builds embedded inside fake revolutionary PDF manifestos and Skype communications to target, track, and spy on anti-government dissidents, journalists, and activists. In response to mounting evidence that his software was being abused in human-rights violations, Lesueur publicly terminated the project in July 2012, releasing the 'DarkComet RAT Remover' cleanup utility. Leaked builder versions (notably v5.3.1) continue to be circulated and used in low-level cybercrime.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• DarkComet
• DarkComet RAT
• DarkKomet
• Trojan.DarkComet
• Backdoor.Win32.DarkKomet

Threat Actor Attribution

Attribution is probabilistic, not a science. Each link below states its confidence level and the evidence behind it.

• Jean-Pierre Lesueur (DarkCoderSC) / Syrian Electronic Army & Global Threat Groups High confidence
  Basis: Authored by Jean-Pierre Lesueur (DarkCoderSC) who voluntarily ceased development in 2012 due to weaponization by Syrian state-sponsored actors and cybercriminals, documented by Citizen Lab and EFF reports. [source]

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Darkcomet V2.X · Darkcomet V3.X · Darkcomet V5.1 · Darkcomet V5.3.1 (Final Release)

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
• T1113: Monitor for frequent or unauthorized screen captures or clipboard reads. Restrict background applications from accessing desktop APIs.
• T1125: Restrict access to local camera or microphone APIs. Utilize endpoint protection that monitors hardware access.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2012-0158 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2010-3333 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Command & Control (C2) and Network Profile

How this family talks to its operators. C2 traffic can often identify a family even when its code and configuration are hard to analyse. Ports and patterns are historical and change between campaigns, so use them as hunting leads rather than block-only rules.

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 0f9df76435c4ea57a419ebca3bf437f1c1f51600863eb4cfae34898ce0ee68db
• 910adabf82ee91008f1bdf507df0a7b57b98d1a12a52efc75e2b0051e7075727

Delivery vectors

• Spear-phishing and social engineering campaigns over Skype and chat networks delivering zipped executables disguised as activist documents
• Malicious Word and RTF documents exploiting CVE-2012-0158 dropping DarkComet payloads

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run autorun key creation
• System startup folder shortcuts and process injection into svchost.exe

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_DARKKOMET_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Darkkomet"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "darkkomet" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "darkcomet" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "darkcomet rat" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "darkkomet" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "trojan.darkcomet" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "backdoor.win32.darkkomet" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Darkkomet (Rat) Execution & Triage
id: 8fe3e3e8-dc95-57c2-b06a-081197a102c2
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Darkkomet malware family. Detects unauthorized persistence creation via
  Windows Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and privilege escalation indicative
  of RAT installations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/darkkomet
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.rat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1113
- attack.t1125
- attack.t1071_001
- attack.t1547_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \reg.exe
    - \schtasks.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - \CurrentVersion\Run
    - /create /tn
    - bypass -enc
    - net user /add
    - net localgroup administrators
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_DARKKOMET_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Darkkomet tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "darkkomet" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Immediately isolate the compromised host from internal LAN and WAN environments to cut off interactive remote shell sessions established by Darkkomet.
2. Inspect active socket listeners and outbound established network connections ('netstat -ano') to identify and sever covert TCP/UDP channels used by Darkkomet.
3. Scan Windows Services, Scheduled Tasks, and Startup folders to locate and eliminate persistent backdoor listeners configured by Darkkomet.
4. Invalidate all active VPN profiles, local administrator credentials, and session tokens that may have been harvested by the Darkkomet operator.
5. Re-image the affected host using a validated golden image prior to reconnecting it to enterprise network segments.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not attempt to interact with or send messages through the Darkkomet remote terminal, as this alerts the attacker and may cause them to execute destructive anti-forensic commands.
2. Avoid relying solely on static file signatures, as Darkkomet payloads frequently execute reflectively in memory without writing binaries to disk.

References & External Analysis

• MITRE ATT&CK - DarkComet (S0334)
• Citizen Lab Report - Syrian Activists Targeted with DarkComet RAT
• EFF Threat Intelligence - DarkComet Analysis
• Search "darkkomet" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "darkkomet" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "darkkomet" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Rat)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Nanocore
• Ghost
• Turkojan
• Bladabindi
• Recam
• Netwire
• Plugx
• Beast

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/darkkomet.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.